Quantum-resilient cybersecurity: Evaluating the impact of post-quantum cryptography on identity, asset and network security models

Tim Abdiukov *

NTS Netzwerk Telekom Service AG, Australia.
 
Review
World Journal of Advanced Engineering Technology and Sciences, 2024, 13(02), 986–997.
Article DOI: 10.30574/wjaets.2024.13.2.0593
Publication history: 
Received on 27 October 2024; revised on 21 December 2024; accepted on 28 December 2024
 
Abstract: 
With the growth and advancement of quantum computing, conventional cryptographic methods are becoming increasingly vulnerable, particularly in the core aspects of cybersecurity, including identity, asset, and network security. In detail, the following paper will provide a systematic analysis of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in these areas. It discusses the theoretical foundations and operational potential of PQC algorithms, including those based on lattices, which aim to withstand quantum attacks, enhance authentication systems, protect digital assets, and maintain secure network communications. Considering the standards efforts, such as the work by NIST and real-life projects (current implementations of NewHope by Google and pilot projects by AWS), as well as the implementation difficulties that the domain faces, the article provides an overview of strategies related to migration. It explains both the potential and the challenges that face the introduction of PQC into current security infrastructures. It focuses on hybrid cryptography, side-channel robustness, performance trade-offs, and regulatory issues. Ultimately, the findings of this study suggest adopting PQC as a proactive rather than a defensive approach, providing an opportunity to redesign the structure of contemporary cybersecurity to achieve greater security in the face of emerging threats in the future.
 
Keywords: 
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC); Quantum-Resilient Security; Lattice-Based Cryptography; Identity Management; Asset Protection; Network Security
 
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Copyright information: 
Copyright © 2024 Author(s) retain the copyright of this article. This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Liscense 4.0